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JULIAN HANICH 
(UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN) 
 
WATCHING A FILM WITH OTHERS 
 TOWARDS A THEORY OF COLLECTIVE SPECTATORSHIP 
 
 
[A revised version of this pre-print has been accepted for publication in 
Screen. Volume 55, Issue 3, 2014.] 
 
In this article I suggest that collectively watching a film in silent attention 
should be regarded as a joint action. When silently watching a film together in 
a cinema (or elsewhere) the viewers are not engaged in individual actions that 
run parallel to each other – watching a film with others often implies a shared 
activity based on a collective intention in which the viewers jointly attend to a 
single object: the film. To be sure, this type of joint action is not in every respect 
comparable to more emphatic and skilful collective activities like ballet dan-
cing, singing in a choir or marching in a peace parade. Compared to playing a 
piece of orchestral music together or playing badminton together, watching a 
film in silent attention is a somewhat special case. First, it is also possible that 
we do it alone. Plus, the common goal of watching the film is rather easily 
achieved. This simple – but, in fact, tricky – aspect should not make us oblivi-
ous to the essentially and irreducibly social experience of the theatrical situa-
tion and the joint action it may involve.1 
Proponents of diverse film theoretical approaches such as cultural 
studies, cognitive film theory, film phenomenology or reception aesthetics 
consider the viewer actively involved with the film: he or she decodes and 
interprets the film, consciously builds hypotheses and draws inferences, fills 
blanks and omissions, visually imagines what is suggested but not shown etc. 
This is not to deny that watching a film is simultaneously characterised by a 
certain passivity, particularly when compared to other more prototypical ac-
tions. Granting a passive as well as an active doing makes it possible to ignore 
the much discussed, but overly broad and fuzzy distinction between an active 
and a passive viewer: while passive in some sense, the viewer is simulta-
neously active in another. 
Now, it is, of course, a thorny issue to define actions.2 Nevertheless, I 
believe that ‘watching a film’ consists of various characteristics that should 
allow us to treat it as an action proper. ‘Watching a film’ can be considered a 
mental action once we devote our ongoing attention and interest to the film in 
order to follow it to its end. This act is voluntary, not only in the broad sense of 
‘under my control,’ but also in the sense that is specific to human action: It is 
motivated by my own desire as well as my intention to find out how the film 
progresses. I seem to have a free choice and nothing stands in the way of me 
performing it. Moreover, once we agree that some doings are actions even if 
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our effort is limited and happens with no great strain, ‘watching a film’ should 
be regarded as a sustained action. Inversely, we would have trouble with defin-
ing ‘watching a film’ as an action only if we, firstly, restricted the definition of 
action to overt bodily actions like paying for admission, but not allow mental 
actions like ‘paying’ attention to a film; and secondly if we would only include 
events like walking to the cinema, but not states like purposely watching mov-
ing images for ninety minutes with the intention of following the progress of 
the film to its end, and of enjoying it. In the comparable case of meditation, we 
would most likely have no problem in granting that meditation is an instance 
of a sustained action. Silently watching a film is somewhat like meditating: it is 
a sustained mental act that lasts some ninety minutes or so.3 
But if you as spectator and I as spectator and all the others in the audi-
ence as spectators are all active, sitting in the same cinema watching the same 
film in a silent, attentive way – does it sound outlandish to argue that in some 
important sense you, I and the others are acting jointly? Just compare the quali-
tative difference between the silent attentive audience and, say, a crowd of 
people sitting in a train compartment or sleeping next to each other in a hospi-
tal room: while we might agree that the former share an activity, we would 
hesitate to argue that the latter act jointly. Moreover, it can hardly be denied 
that there is a substantial phenomenological difference between watching a 
film in a cinema alone and following the film as part of a silent attentive audi-
ence. I will therefore propose that silently watching a film as part of a collective 
is a shared activity based on a we-intention and a joint attention focused on a 
collective intentional object. 
There is no doubt that the silent collectivity of the theatrical experience 
rarely becomes thematic in a full-fledged sense: the audience predominantly 
experiences jointly without reflectively experiencing each other. I therefore 
need to emphasise that the viewer’s conscious experience of others is pre-
dominantly a phenomenon at the margins of consciousness that can become 
explicit, but it certainly does not have to be reflected upon. This implies, in turn, 
that even when an audience pays ‘full’ attention to the film, the individual 
viewer has not ‘forgotten’ the other co-present spectators – they have simply 
receded to the fringe of the field of consciousness. What is more, throughout 
the film this basso continuo of pre-reflective acting jointly may be supplemented 
by feeling jointly. During specific moments of high emotionality the collectivity 
can reach a higher level: shared activity plus shared feeling. Again, this is not to 
say that these shared feelings are necessarily fully reflected upon, but they may 
more likely become part of the audience’s focal consciousness. Thus in special 
cases the collective experience can become thematic in the strong sense of the 
word. 
 
If we look at historical instructions on how to watch films, we would have to 
locate the ideal type of the silent attentive audience at the far end of Vachel 
Lindsay’s 'Conversational Theatre'. The American poet’s model of a cinema 
	   3 
with no sound except the critically conversing, intellectually active audience 
murmuring 'like a pleasant brook' is the prototype of a public sphere of com-
municative exchange.4 In 1915 Lindsay proposed this way of film exhibition 
and reception to local exhibitors, encouraging them to make viewers discuss 
and aesthetically judge the picture with their friends in a kind of running 
commentary. 
But what would be a good example for a silent attentive audience? A 
perfect instance can be found in Peter Kubelka’s 'Invisible Cinema', designed 
for the Anthology Film Archive in New York. Its alleged sole function was to 
bring ‘the filmed message from the author to the beholder with a minimum of 
loss’ and in which ‘the film can completely dictate the sensation of space,’ as 
the Austrian inventor of the Invisible Cinema put it.5 No latecomers were 
admitted; apart from some exit signs installed for safety reasons, everything 
was kept in black; the elevated seats with their ‘shell-like structure’ were de-
signed to shield the viewer’s upper body and to make it impossible to see one’s 
neighbours to the sides as well as in the front and in the back. While this ar-
rangement might sound like the antithesis of joint action and collective experi-
ence, almost the opposite is true: the ‘aspect of community’ played a significant 
role in Kubelka’s concept. Kubelka did not conceive of the viewing situation as 
a solitary confrontation with the film, but had specifically planned the cinema 
with the collective aspect in mind. In 1974, shortly after the Invisible Cinema 
was closed, he described its collective dimension:  
You knew that there were many people in the room, you could feel their presence, 
and you also would hear them a little bit, but in a very subdued way, so they 
would not disturb your contact with the film. A sympathetic community was 
created, a community in which people liked each other. In the average cinema 
where the heads of other people are in the screen, where I hear them crunching 
their popcorn, where the latecomers force themselves through the rows and 
where I have to hear their talk, which takes me out of the cinematic reality 
which I have come to participate in, I start to dislike the others. Architecture 
has to provide a structure in which one is in a community that is not disturbing to 
others.6 
Hence even in extreme cases of silent attention, the collectivity of the audience 
makes itself felt. The Conversational Theatre and the Invisible Cinema involve 
two very different types of collectivity, but both are collective nonetheless. 
I will go even further and suggest that collectively watching a film in silent 
attention should be considered as a kind of joint action. This claim rests, of 
course, on the question of how one defines ‘watching a film with others’. Argu-
ing that the audience’s joint action is based on joint attention presupposes that 
there is attention to the film in the first place. People who talk, who sleep, who 
kiss, who send text messages on their cell phones do not attend (let alone at-
tend jointly) in the emphatic sense of the word – and hence do not watch the 
film in the way I define it here. This is, of course, not to deny that people may 
temporarily drift away. By granting that not all viewers in the audience watch 
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the film together all of the time, my definition is not blind to the widespread 
phenomenon of distraction and diversion. However, those who focus their at-
tention on the film – that is, most viewers most of the time – contribute their 
individual share to the joint action of the attentive audience.7 In a phrase: those 
who do watch the film, watch it with others – and therefore watch it jointly. 
To be sure, the silent attentive audience does not exist in an artificial 
vacuum left untouched by various influences ranging from the architecture 
and interior design of the cinema to the technological equipment used and the 
films projected, not to forget various social factors. Hence the intensity of the 
silent collective experience – the role it plays in actual cinematic constellations 
– depends on a variety of empirical variables. To begin with, there is the archi-
tecture of the cinema: does stadium seating hide me from others and my co-
spectators from me? And: Do we sit in a small, rather intimate shoebox cinema 
or in a large modern-day megaplex? Moreover, the interior design can contri-
bute its share, as when reflections from the walls or lights from exit signs 
illuminate the audience. So, too, does the sound system: does the loudness 
drown the presence of the other viewers and turn my attention predominantly 
toward the film or am I conscious of their silent attention? Other variables are 
the size of the screen (Am I placed in front of a small screen or an IMAX screen 
that dominates my attention?) as well as my place in the audience (Do I choose 
a seat in the front, the centre or the back of the cinema?). There is also the ques-
tion of institutional context: am I attending the film at a premiere, a press 
screening, a film festival or in an educational context such as a seminar screen-
ing? The number of spectators also plays a role, because it certainly makes a 
difference if I watch the film with two or with eight hundred other viewers. 
Next we may think of the density of seating: do I sit very closely to my co-
viewers or are we scattered around the audience, sitting far apart? No doubt, 
the intimacy of the social connections may influence collective experience, too: 
do I know all of the other viewers or are we a completely anonymous group of 
people in a city centre cinema? Do I attend the film alone or with one or more 
companions? Last, but not least, we must not ignore what kind of film is 
shown: is it an immersive action film or a silent drama, an experimental film or 
a documentary? 
 
All of these aspects can influence the audience’s collective experience. It would 
seem to me an extremely worthwhile endeavour to create more empirical 
knowledge about these factors – via third-person quantitative research, via 
second-person qualitative interviews, via first-person phenomenological de-
scriptions or some productive combination thereof. Unfortunately, this is not 
something I can provide here. What I propose, then, is merely a theoretical ab-
straction of silent collective spectatorship. I suggest my definition as an ideal 
type in the Weberian sense. This ideal type might serve as a heuristic to com-
pare actual historical cases of various and diverse silent attentive audiences 
actively following various kinds of films, genres and modes. Moreover, dis-
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cussing the silent attentive mode as an ideal type also implies that I have to 
downplay the fact that in reality the silence might be interrupted by instances 
of laughing, screaming, moaning or gasping. These and other forms of expres-
sive response bring the collective aspect to the fore in quite different ways and 
should be taken into account in a comprehensive phenomenology of shared 
spectatorship. I have made suggestions along these lines in a number of previ-
ous articles.8 
 
This essay draws its inspiration from recent debates in analytic philosophy and 
phenomenology about collective intentionality and shared feelings.9 Following 
the lead of philosophers like Raimo Tuomela and John Searle, Hans Bernhard 
Schmid, Margaret Gilbert and others have refined this complex discussion 
about social ontology. I will rephrase some of their arguments with the cine-
matic constellation in mind and show that this import of social philosophy can 
have productive ramifications for film theory and historiography. I believe that 
it serves at least three goals. 
First, it may help to revaluate the silent attentive audience, which in re-
cent years has been (either implicitly or explicitly) compared unfavourably 
with other, more expressive or communicative types of audience. Think of 
praise for the spectators of early cinema, the vocal audiences of cult films, the 
boisterous consumers of gross-out movies or the Indian audience. Hence 
Miriam Hansen approvingly talks about the ‘casual, sociable if not boisterous, 
atmosphere’ of the nickelodeon with its interactive experience and contrasts it 
with the restrained middle-class viewer and the ‘merely passive experience’ of 
Classical Hollywood. William Paul honours the expressive activity of specta-
tors of gross-out horror films and animal comedies (and implicitly disregards 
silent attentive spectatorship). As Lakshmi Srinivas points out, the advantages 
of the Indian way of watching films: ‘In Western societies mainstream film 
audiences [...] rarely talk out loud and never engage in the overtly interactive 
and spontaneously expressive style of reception seen in theatres in India and 
with Indian audiences. [...] Rather than the loss of community and face-to-face 
relations, which theorists such as Adorno and Horkheimer associated with the 
growth of mass culture in the West, the Indian case reveals the generation of 
community and face-to-face interaction through consumption of mass media.’10 
In a somewhat simplified and schematic way we can conceive of the difference 
between the silent attentive audience (film theorist Francesco Casetti would 
call this kind of spectatorship ‘attendance’) and more expressive and distracted 
types of spectatorship (Casetti would speak of ‘performance’) in binary opposi-
tions: restrained behaviour vs. outspoken behaviour; display of emotion vs. 
suppression of emotion; loss of agency vs. entitlement; discipline vs freedom; 
physical passivity vs. bodily activity; silence vs. vocal expressivity; and, most 
important of all: individuality vs. collectivity.11 However, as we shall see, there 
is much to be said in favour of the ‘active silence’ of the attentive audience.12 
The schematic binary oppositions simply do not hold. 
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Second, my argument may have consequences for film historiography. 
Below I test my proposal by using it as the backbone of a critical rereading of 
an influential film historical thesis. For scholars like Miriam Hansen and 
Thomas Elsaesser the transition from early cinema to Classical Hollywood 
Cinema implies a profound change in terms of the social relations of the cinema: 
a loss of collectivity and an individualisation of the audience. This ‘individual-
isation thesis’, as I will call it, has since gained the status of received wisdom 
and is repeated unquestioningly in articles and encyclopaedias.13 However, it 
seems overstated to me, precisely because the silent attentive reception of 
Classical Cinema more easily allowed for joint attention, joint action and even 
shared feelings. Hence it is far from clear why Classical reception should auto-
matically result in individualisation – what happens is a shift in types of collec-
tivity. Audience interrelations may no longer be dialogic. Yet they are not 
merely imaginary either (as are, for instance, the ‘imagined communities’ of 
dispersed television audiences). This essay may therefore also be seen as a cri-
tique of normative conceptions of collectivity based on communicative dis-
course and face-to-face interaction.  
Third, my proposition can be seen as a step toward a more comprehen-
sive theorisation and phenomenology of collective spectatorship in the cinema, 
an aspect comparatively undervalued in the history of thinking about the 
cinema.14 Apart from some important exceptions (Edgar Morin or Roland 
Barthes come to mind), the cinema’s collective experience has for the longest time 
played a negligible role in thinking about the cinematic dispositif as such.15 It 
has mostly been taken for granted, unless discussing the audience helped to 
distinguish one type of film-historical period, genre or national cinema from 
another (hence the arguments about the audiences of early cinema, cult 
movies, horror films, teenage comedies or Bollywood films). Not even at the 
height of the discussion about the cinematic apparatus did the collective ex-
perience come into view. Take Jean-Louis Baudry’s seminal articles on the 
cinematic apparatus.16 For Baudry the cinematic apparatus consists of the dark 
inside of the cinema, the relative passivity of the situation, the forced immo-
bility as well as the projection of moving images – but there is not a single 
word on the other anonymous viewers co-present in the cinema. Baudry re-
lates every argument to the single viewing ‘subject’. Only in recent years pro-
ponents of New Cinema History like Richard Maltby, Melvyn Stokes, Annette 
Kuhn, Philippe Meers or Robert C. Allen have started highlighting the social 
significance of watching films. What is missing in their historical approach so 
far is both the phenomenology of the cinema’s collectivity (i.e. the lived experi-
ence of being part of an audience) and, more specifically, a theory of the collec-
tive aspects of the silent attentive audience. 
One of the reasons for the historical reluctance to theorise the cinema’s 
(silent) collective experience might be the fact that other art forms--like theatre, 
opera, ballet or classical music--also involve silent audiences. Eager to demon-
strate what is specific about the cinema film theorists in the past largely down-
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played what cinema shares with other arts. While this argument might have 
some explanatory value for the history of film theory, it still leaves open what 
distinguishes these various types of collective audiences. Unfortunately, in this 
article I cannot focus on these differences: what I develop with the silent atten-
tive audience of the cinema in mind, may grosso modo be the case for silent 
audiences in theatres, operas or concert halls as well. What makes the cinema’s 
silent attentive audiences special merits further fine-grained discussion – a 
discussion that would have to take into account, among other things, the lack 
of co-presence of the performers (i.e. the screen effect) and the more pervasive 
darkness in most cinemas. Unless they want to argue that theatre, opera and 
cinema involve an identical form of collective experience, film scholars (myself 
included) should try to demonstrate their competence in comparative media 
studies. However, while further research seems strongly called for, I do not 
think that the level of inclusiveness and generality of the present article de-
values the applicability of my suggestions for film theory or historiography. 
 
Before my argument might sound plausible, however, I need to address some 
terms that so far have only been mentioned in passing: we-intention, joint at-
tention and joint action. 
 
We-Intentions In what way can we say that each individual member of the 
audience has a we-intention to watch the film jointly rather than an I-intention 
to simply watch the film? Since we usually do not know most of the other spec-
tators, we can hardly say ‘we-intend’ to watch the film. Or perhaps we can? 
I believe there are various reasons why we can assume that watching a 
film with others implies an intention and commitment to watching the film 
jointly. At the very least, simply by choosing a certain film, deciding upon a 
specific screening time, driving to the cinema, queueing, buying an 8 Euro 
ticket and taking a seat in the audience we signal that we have the common goal 
of watching this particular film. As such, we perform a minimal practical we-
intention for each other: by attending the film we share a goal and therefore 
form a voluntary association for a certain amount of time.17 This practical collec-
tive intentionality (we have a common goal right now) can be distinguished 
from cognitive collective intentionality (we share a common opinion or convic-
tion at this moment) or affective collective intentionality (we have a common 
emotion or mood right now).18 The former does not have to presuppose a 
shared cognition and affect, but often it includes both. Firstly, by attending the 
show we also signal a common interest in this particular film: the cognitive col-
lective intentionality refers to sharing the opinion or conviction that this film is 
worth watching and that we might all have a common taste. Secondly, from the 
outset our co-presence might also indicate a minimal affective collective inten-
tionality as we presumably share the common hope for a ‘good’ film and the 
common anticipation of an experience that is worthwhile – otherwise we would 
not be here. Of course, stronger forms of shared emotions and moods--being 
	   8 
afraid together, say, or enjoying the film together--can later supplement this 
minimal affective collective intentionality throughout the film. 
In particular cases these minimal types of practical, cognitive and affec-
tive collective intentionality may be more intensive. Consequently, there is a 
continuum from weak to strong forms of collective intentionality. On the 
strong end of the spectrum there is a straightforward we-intention to watch the 
film together – an intention often expressed verbally. Think of the family, the 
couple, or the group of friends who go to the cinema as a family, a couple, a 
group of friends. Provided they have collectively decided to attend the film, 
their decision expresses a we-intention rather than an I-intention. Or think of 
the film night in my home to which I invite various friends: in this case we all 
have a strong intention to watch the film together, since my friends would 
surely be able to rent the DVD on their own. I want to label these cases instan-
ces of strong we-intention. In the case of medium we-intention we may think a 
group of people going to the cinema largely anonymously, but still as part of a 
specific collective or community. The Danish Embassy in Berlin invites fellow 
Danes to watch the opening film of a retrospective devoted to Danish cinema. 
Fans of Manchester United, and of Eric Cantona in particular, go to see Looking 
for Eric (Ken Loach, 2009), in which the former Manchester United star plays a 
major role. Star Wars fans, having camped in front of the cinema for hours or 
even days, eagerly watch the first screening of the newest instalment of George 
Lucas’s saga. These groups share a certain identity as Danes, ManUnited fans 
or Star Wars aficionados. Here the we-intention might not be as strong as in the 
first examples. But as long as the individual members of the audience consider 
themselves a part of a larger collective, we may assume there will be a medium 
we-intention. 
But even in the majority of cases in which we simply drive to the 
neighbourhood cinema in order to watch the newest film, we can speak of a 
weak we-intention once we slightly change the perspective. Most of the time we 
may not have an explicitly formulated goal to watch a film together with other 
anonymous viewers. However, sitting at this time of the day in this cinema in 
this neighbourhood with this audience for this film, the experience stands out 
from the normal flow of life. Moreover, once we adhere to the social norms of 
behaviour, we implicitly acknowledge that we have a common goal: to watch the 
film. This is not to deny that there might be many reasons why we go to the 
cinema rather than watching the film at home: the film comes out earlier; the 
screen is bigger; the quality of the image is better; the sound-system is more 
impressive, and so on. At the same time, however, we do not behave as we 
would in our private surroundings: the fact that we sacrifice many of our 
short-term self-interests like answering the phone or talking to our partner 
underscores our joint – not just private – intention to watch the film (I will come 
back to the cinema’s normative agreement below). 
Furthermore, the fact that watching a film in the cinema involves some-
thing more than an I-intention follows from the relatively high price we pay in 
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terms of personal freedom. Thomas Elsaesser has characterised the theatrical 
experience as a ‘fixed term of imprisonment.’ The viewer is ‘pinned to his seat’ 
and ‘enclosed in a darkened room, cut off visually from the surroundings and 
exposed to a state of isolation.’19 Comparing the filmic atmospheres of three 
dispositifs – the living room, the museum and the cinema – Margrit Tröhler 
points out the freedom to come and go when looking at a moving-image instal-
lation or projection in a museum.20 Hence in a museum we are much more 
dependent on our decision to stay or go than we are in the cinema. Since in the 
cinema the common goal of watching the film requires such a comparatively 
strong adherence to social norms, we can infer that accepting these social norms 
and rules implies that we tacitly signal our (albeit weak) we-intention. We all 
want to see this film. And--we all agree to see it jointly. 
Lest this might sound too schematic or homogenising, let me point out 
that within a single auditorium various levels of we-intention can exist simul-
taneously, even within a single spectator. A hypothetical viewer from Copen-
hagen visiting a retrospective of Danish films in Berlin can at one and the same 
time have a strong we-intention to watch the film with her husband, a medium 
we-intention to view it with the other co-present Danes, and a weak we-
intention to see it with the whole audience. 
 
Joint Attention refers to the fact that you, I and others present have a common 
understanding of ‘what we are doing’ and that we are not focussing on the 
same thing by accident.21 We must have a minimal mutual awareness that we 
are perceiving the same thing. But this awareness need not be reflective: I do 
not need to focus on the others jointly attending. It can also be relegated to the 
fringe of consciousness. Tom Cochrane, in an article on joint attention to music, 
points out that ‘joint attention can vary in intensity […] as a product of how 
much we monitor each other.’22 But given that in silent attentive audiences 
there is little or no verbal communication and little or no face-to-face interac-
tion, how can we explicitly infer or implicitly presuppose that we, as an audi-
ence, follow the film in joint attention? 
First of all, there are the preconditions of the cinematic dispositif, which 
rule out that we have the same intentional object by accident. Our seats are all 
facing towards a single object: the illuminated screen which stands out from 
the surrounding darkness. The unidirectional seating position prevents us 
from looking at each other: our vectors of perception and attention are directed 
towards the film. In contrast with the museum, say, there is little else to focus 
on. When moving through the museum the visitor is constantly confronted 
with questions about the time and attention he or she should pay to various 
objects. Citing an observation by Serge Daney, Volker Pantenburg argues that 
in fact the museum visitor’s aimless stroll past video installations resembles 
(window-)shopping behaviour.23 Film viewers, on the other hand, do not have 
to face the same series of choices, because they are devoted to the single object 
on display: the film.  
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Secondly, there is an absence of motor activity. The structure of most 
cinemas is not conducive to bodily activity: viewers do not wander around, but 
remain seated throughout the film. Consider, again, the case of watching a film 
in a museum: the black box projection room or the space in front the monitor is 
a place of transition.24 The dispositif of the museum is much more mobile and 
individualistic and thus allows for joint attention only briefly, if at all. In con-
trast, sitting in their seats viewers in the cinema deactivate specific parts of 
their body, rob themselves of their motor freedom, in order to pay full attention 
to the film. As Pantenburg points out, the early 1970s were not only the age of 
paranoid apparatus theory which characterized the cinematic situation as cap-
tivating, but also a time of utopian ideas about the cinema as a place of fo-
cused, concentrated perception. Filmmakers like Hollis Frampton, Peter 
Kubelka or Robert Smithson regarded immobility and stillness as precondi-
tions for (joint) attention.25 (Here one might spot the seeds of an ethical argu-
ment in favour of silent attentive viewing. As in recent discussions about 
‘slow’ or ‘contemplative’ cinema and its merits in terms of the ‘dedicated atten-
tion’ and ‘emotionally rich experience’ in minimalist film, the joint attention of 
the silent attentive audience may potentially – albeit not necessarily – imply 
more meaningful ways of watching films in our contemporary ‘attention econ-
omy.’)26  
Thirdly, and most importantly, we can explicitly infer or implicitly pre-
suppose that we follow the film in joint attention once there is silence, and an 
absence of verbal interaction prevails. The silence is an audible phenomenon 
just like more specific acoustic reactions such as talking, laughing or scream-
ing. Importantly, in my definition of ‘silent attention’ I presuppose attention. 
Hence the collective silence in the cinema cannot derive from passively doing 
nothing. My definition therefore rules out an auditorium of sleeping viewers. 
The ‘silent attention’s’ silence is the outcome of a concentrated audiovisual at-
tention. Of course, this definition presumes a third-person perspective that 
simply postulates an attentive audience. But what about the first-person per-
spective? As long as I do not actively assume that the other co-present viewers 
are sleeping or absent-minded (which for various reasons I usually do not), I 
will always tacitly presuppose that their silence indicates attention. From this 
perspective, we can describe silence as a specific type of communication: it 
signals that the film and its collective reception prevail over individual reac-
tions. Hence silence does not mean an absence of collectivity (just as the lack of 
motor activity does not signal disembodied viewing). Once other viewers start 
to talk, send text messages or move around the auditorium, we realize that 
during these moments their attention and our attention are not joint. 
The fact that the silent attentive audience is united in joint attention 
during the film may become even more obvious when we compare it to the 
moments before the film begins. People walk through the auditorium looking 
for seats; they chat with their neighbours; they talk on their mobile phones; 
they read magazines. Once the lights go out a transitional period begins that 
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consists of commercials and trailers and may involve the film's opening titles. 
During this phase one can sense a shift: the scattered foci are gradually united 
and directed towards a common intentional object – the film. A ‘phenomenal 
change’ takes place, as Hans Bernhard Schmid would put it, from the dis-
persed attention of individuals to a we-intention and joint attention of the 
audience.27 
 
Joint Action is sometimes mentioned in the same breath with joint attention. 
For instance, in a recent article, Anika Fiebich and Shaun Gallagher argue that 
intentional joint attention – i.e. joint attention in which individuals ‘intend to be 
mutually attentive towards the same entity (where the shared intention may 
just be to maintain joint attention)’ – already qualifies as a basic joint action.28 
Here I want to discuss joint attention and joint action separately, partly be-
cause I wish to emphasize the stronger – and maybe more controversial – claim 
that the joint attention of the silent attentive audience goes beyond a ‘basic’ 
joint action. In the literature on collective intentionality at least three aspects 
recur with regard to joint action: attuned behaviour, we-intentions and norma-
tive agreements. 
The philosopher Angelika Krebs defines attuned behaviour as follows: 
‘In joint action the participants continuously attune their inputs to the inputs of 
the others and to the action to be actualized […], taking the others to be doing 
the same kind of attuning’.29 If in an orchestra one person plays a different tune 
from the rest, it becomes blatantly obvious. If one dance partner stops moving, 
there is no longer joint action. On the face of it, this might seem different in the 
cinema. Here, behaviour that is not in tune with the common goal of watching 
the film together can become conspicuous (think of talking on the mobile 
phone), but it can also go unnoticed (consider someone falling asleep). How-
ever, the fact that someone can stop acting jointly without becoming noticeable 
does not disqualify watching a film together in silent attention as a case of joint 
action. While in many paradigmatic cases of joint action the whole cannot be 
thought without the individual parts (think of the dance example), this does 
not apply to every case: the viewer who falls asleep simply does not partake 
any longer; but the rest of the audience is still acting jointly.  
Furthermore, prototypical joint action seems to be characterised either 
by identical motor movements (walking in a parade) or attuned motor move-
ments (playing in an orchestra). Again, prima facie, this seems to be different in 
the cinema: isn’t the cinema audience characterised precisely by its lack of 
motor movements? So how can we speak of action, let alone joint action? We 
can speak of action precisely because actions cannot be reduced to motor 
movements. Even if prototypical examples of action rely on motor movements, 
paying attention to a film – watching and listening to its unfolding – is a mental 
action based on perception. As noted in the introduction, today very few film 
theorists would consider the viewer as a passive receptacle. Secondly, we may 
talk about joint action as long as the collective audience fulfils a necessary con-
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dition of joint action: attuned behaviour. In the case of the silent attentive audi-
ence the synchronisation and coordination of behaviour depends on three pre-
requisites: stillness, silence and attention. Viewers show restraint in motor ac-
tivity by not going in and out or walking around; viewers do not talk on their 
mobile phones, whistle, scream, burp, moan, and so on; viewers refrain from 
other silent activities like reading, fondling or playing with their mobile phone, 
devoting their attention to the film. Taken together, sitting and watching in 
silence do not imply an absence of motor movements, but are exactly a form of 
synchronisation of activity: silence and motor stillness coordinate what might 
otherwise result in highly diverse motor movements, comportments and ex-
pressions, and thus signal a joint attention. Of course, there might be more 
obvious examples of cinematic joint action such as laughing together, scream-
ing together, singing along together or speaking the dialogue together. How-
ever, this would not only reduce action to expressive behaviour and ignore the 
active attention of the silent attentive audience, but would also give too much 
weight to a few exceptional kinds of behaviour.  
However, the synchronised and coordinated behaviour of joint atten-
tion is merely a necessary condition from which one might infer the joint action 
of the silent attentive audience, but it is not sufficient.30 In other words, just 
because silence and stillness prevail does not mean that we are dealing with 
cases of joint action. As a consequence, the joint action of the cinema is not 
something that can be observed from a third-person perspective--for instance, 
via infrared cameras. In an extreme case the camera might show four hundred 
people silently following the film, when in fact they are all day-dreaming 
about very different things. Following Hans Bernhard Schmid we may assume 
that we-intentions are another necessary condition for joint action and group 
membership.31 Importantly, a reflective awareness of being part of a group is 
not a necessary condition for the existence of a group: we do not have to reflect 
on – and thus be consciously aware of – the fact that we belong to a certain 
collective in order to be part of it.32 This point requires re-emphasis because 
critics may object that in the cinema we are often not aware that we are acting 
jointly. As long as there are we-intentions and the attuned behaviour of joint 
attention, we do not need to be fully aware of our collective activity. 
However, it seems crucial that the three types of we-intention, as dis-
tinguished by Schmid, do not contradict each other: practical collective inten-
tionality (sharing a goal), cognitive collective intentionality (sharing an opinion 
or conviction) and affective collective intentionality (sharing an emotion or 
mood). Even in the case of a practical we-intention to watch a particular film as 
well as an active joint attention of the whole audience, one would not be able 
to decide from a third-person perspective that every single viewer following 
the film in silent attention is part of a jointly acting audience. Joint attention 
and the common goal of watching the film are not enough when the practical 
collective intentionality is disrupted or contradicted by the fact that there are 
differences in cognitive or affective collective intentionality. Think, say, of a fe-
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male viewer watching a misogynist action film with a male audience and in-
terpreting their silent attention as a sign of a pleasurable viewing experience 
that she cannot share. Here the silent attention of the other viewers signals to 
the individual viewer her difference in terms of cognitive collective intentionality 
(she finds the film politically retrograde, whereas the others do not care) and 
affective collective intentionality (she is angry at the filmmakers, whereas the 
others enjoy the film). This particular viewer would hardly say that she and the 
other viewers watched the film jointly. It seems important, however, that in 
this case the audience situation becomes thematic: the viewer is conscious of 
her difference. However, as long as it does not become thematic in a negative 
way the we-intentions and joint attention of the silent attentive audience are 
simply presupposed. The assumed commonalities often prevail until differ-
ences become thematic. 
Perhaps the most obvious objection to my argument that the silent at-
tentive audience acts jointly is the fact that every single viewer would also be 
able to watch the film in identical fashion alone. However, the similarity be-
tween a viewer who watches a film alone and someone who watches it as part 
of a group exists only from the outside. As John Searle would put it: ‘Exter-
nally observed, the two cases are indistinguishable, but they are clearly differ-
ent internally.’33 The objection not only ignores the necessary we-intentions; it 
also overlooks the important point that once I watch the film as a group I im-
mediately have to take into account the normative agreement this entails, includ-
ing its social obligations and entitlements. Consequently, once I follow the 
social norms of the cinema and rely on all the others to do so as well (absence 
of communication, interaction, motor activity and other pursuits), the perspec-
tive changes from I watch the film to we watch the film.  
Importantly, going to the cinema does not only imply that we follow 
social obligations; it also grants the entitlements that come with the commitments 
of we-intentions. This is a point that Margaret Gilbert has drawn attention to.34 
Discussing the example of walking together, she notes: 
As long as people are out on a walk together, they will understand that each 
has an obligation to do what he or she can to achieve the relevant goal. More-
over, each one is entitled to rebuke the other for failure to fulfil this obligation. 
It is doubtful whether the core obligations and entitlements in question are 
moral obligations and entitlements. At the same time, they are not merely a 
matter of prudence or self-interest. Importantly, they seem to be a direct func-
tion of the fact of going for a walk together.35 
Let me rephrase Gilbert’s talk about obligations and entitlements in terms of 
the film experience. As a backdrop I take, again, the not-so-hypothetical case of 
watching a video-film individually in a museum or an art gallery on a monitor. 
There are people standing in the surrounding area whose talk about a different 
museum object distracts me from concentrating fully on the film. In contrast to 
the cinema, where the same kind of talk with the same kind of loudness would 
annoy me a great deal more, I do not feel entitled to reproach them, just as they 
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do not feel an obligation to remain silent. While in the museum space we do 
not have a we-intention to watch the film together, in the cinema we do.36 In 
fact, reproached cinemagoers often tacitly acknowledge other viewers’ entitle-
ment to rebuke them for being disruptive: reminded of their obligation, they 
usually do not argue back. 
The more we expect the cinematic situation to be a shared activity, the 
more significant the normative agreement, the stronger the obligation to act 
accordingly and the bigger the entitlement to be angry about its disruption. 
This is not only true for the silent attentive audience, but goes for expressive 
types of spectatorship as well. Think of someone ostentatiously remaining si-
lent when all others accompany the songs of The Rocky Horror Picture Show (Jim 
Sharman, 1975): other viewers might consider this person’s stubborn refusal to 
act jointly as negatively disruptive. In turn, while I go to the cinema predomi-
nantly for other reasons, I may not be angry at someone who does not partici-
pate in our acting jointly – in fact, I may not even notice a disruption, because 
there was never an expectation of a shared activity in the first place. Take the 
case of noticing someone falling asleep next to you. If you have no we-
intention and the co-viewer is an anonymous other, you might find it funny or 
maybe strange, but you will hardly wake him up to remind him of his obliga-
tion to attend the film together. If you see a film with your husband or wife 
and presuppose a strong form of we-intention because this is a film that you 
were both looking forward to watching together, you might feel disappointed 
or even angry if he or she falls asleep. Hence depending on the strength of the 
expectation of a we-intention, there will be differences in what viewers are 
entitled to expect and what they can remind others of. 
Further evidence for considering collective viewing as a shared activity 
derives from the built-in teleology of joint actions and the obligations and enti-
tlements that come with it: Once we start a joint activity, it implies the expecta-
tion that we finish it together. As Kriebich and Gallagher note, ‘In general, joint 
actions involve the basic joint commitment to pursue the shared intention until 
it’s fulfilled’.37 We can see the pertinence of this point for our discussion once 
we briefly switch to the example of watching a film together on television at 
home. If a couple of friends and I watch a film jointly, there is an implicit 
commitment to watch it until the end. Even if I am bored with the film, I com-
mit myself to not changing the channel, to not reading a newspaper and to not 
setting off for a walk with my dog. These distractions would be considered 
impolite. Of course, it is always possible to negotiate verbally about doing 
something else, but this would involve changing the shared activity. In the 
cinema my commitment to finishing the film as well as the other viewer’s en-
titlement to expect me to watch the film through to the end may not be so ob-
vious (and probably not as strong), but it certainly exists there too. One indica-
tion is the fact that in the cinema viewers tend to feel reluctant and even awk-
ward about leaving prematurely. But if there was no implicit commitment to 
watching the film jointly, why should these anonymous viewers feel a disincli-
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nation or even embarrassment about leaving the cinema? No such commitment 
exists, of course, when I watch a film without others: watching a film on televi-
sion alone, I can be much more inclined to channel-surf or turn off the DVD 
and thus not finish the film. 
Here we can find an argument for the crucial difference between a col-
lective experience based on real co-presence and a collective experience based 
on an audience that I imagine watching the same film in another cinema at the 
same time. Apart from the fact that in the latter case we cannot be influenced 
by the affective atmosphere in the cinema and the emotional contagion it may 
imply, there are no real obligations and entitlements vis-à-vis those other imag-
ined viewers. 
 
So far my argument has been couched largely in negative terms. Let me now 
formulate my case for joint action more positively: absences of verbal com-
munication, expressive non-verbal comments, motor activity and diverse foci 
of attention are at the same time the prerequisite for the presence of silence, 
stillness and a shared intentional object. Silence, for example, does not necessa-
rily imply a negative absence of communication: it can involve a valuable audi-
tory situation in which nothing specific stands out apart from the film. This 
could mean that at least some types of silence and stillness should be cherished 
rather than condemned (although I do not deny that other types of silence can 
be either regulatory and oppressive or negatively disruptive, as in the Rocky 
Horror Picture Show example above). Interesting arguments along these lines 
come from ethnographic work on silent meditation. Michal Pagis suggests that 
in sociological research a negative view predominates, taking silence exclu-
sively as a forced, oppressive situation. As a result of power relations that deny 
the self-expressive voice, destroy the communication-based affinity between 
people and therefore create social distance, silence implies the opposite of 
freedom and community.38 This seems to be the view that underlies much of 
the abovementioned film-scholarly work celebrating the cinematic practices of 
talking, call-and-response, singing along and suchlike as liberating and cre-
ative of social bonds. However, Pagis also shows that there are chosen and 
shared silences that function as constitutive mechanisms allowing for certain 
experiences to surface in the first place – as in collective meditation. 
I would argue that in the cinema the fact that the audience remains si-
lent often functions as a precondition for a synchronised collective experience, 
because it allows for the tacit sense that the others not only act as I do, but also 
experience similarly to me and hence that we act jointly and experience some-
thing collectively. Again, as the notion of “tacit sense” indicates, this is not 
something we consciously focus on. Collective aesthetic experience often relies 
on silence as an important precondition, because expressive reactions – and 
verbal comments in particular – often bring experiential differences to the fore. 
Just think of derisive as opposed to approving laughter. Or consider comments 
like “Wow, look at this!”, “Come on, that’s unbelievable!” or “He’s so cute!”. 
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While these expressive reactions might include some viewers, they simulta-
neously exclude other spectators who think or feel otherwise. And even those 
who feel included in terms of the aesthetic judgment might still feel a rupture 
with regard to joint action – in fact, necessarily so, because commenting ver-
bally on the film involves acting differently from attending to it in silence. 
What was synchronised collective action a moment earlier now temporarily 
veers in different directions. Silence, on the other hand, can allow for a more 
inclusive, albeit tacit, intersubjective experience. As Pagis puts it,  
Silent intersubjectivity is […] qualitatively different from the type arti-
culated by  speech. It allows for a more general and inclusive form of inter-
subjectivity, a form that  is not obsessed with content, with exact com-
parisons of one mind to another. Silent  intersubjectivity can actually 
prevent such processes of ‘othering’ by allowing for dif ference under a 
general rubric of sameness. It offers a wide canopy that connects peo ple based 
on embodied involvement in the same event.39 
The silent attentive audience is particularly conducive to this kind of 
intersubjectivity. As we have seen, small nonverbal cues bolster it, the most 
important being non-movement and silence. This is, of course, not to say that 
the other viewers do indeed experience just as I do. As Pagis points out, ‘since 
miscommunication and misinterpretation are quite common, intersubjectivity 
is more an experience than an actual truth claim about the world.’40 One might 
be totally wrong about the experience of one’s co-viewers and still experience 
intersubjectivity. Even if in actuality we often do not think and feel the same – 
a point that reception studies have made quite clear – the viewer tacitly takes it 
for granted as long as not contradicted or proved otherwise. Hans Bernhard 
Schmid even goes so far as to claim that  
It seems that in everyday life, we experience only very few of our con-
scious states as  our personal conscious states. In fact, it seems that we 
take our conscious states to be  our own only where we have reason to 
think that our conscious states might be differ ent from anyone’s. Where 
this is not the case, we simply think what one thinks or  what is generally 
thought, in an a-personal or anonymous mode, as it were. We do not 
 take our thoughts or feelings to be our own in any meaningful sense.41 
While we do not have to follow Schmid’s strong claim all the way, we 
may still argue that in aesthetic contexts we often subconsciously ‘project’ our 
individual experience onto others and thus make it unintentionally and pre-
reflectively a temporary norm. Cinematic joint action and experience appear in 
the likeness of our own experience – as long as no one disproves it by doing 
and feeling something else or until I shift my focus on the singularity of my 
own experience (and even make this singularity public, for instance, by 
connoisseur laughter or verbal comment). If this sounds too much like 
Freudian narcissism, it might become less controversial when put the other 
way round. In aesthetic experience individual viewers do not presuppose that 
everyone feels differently all the time: the likeness of the experience is tacitly 
taken as a default. To be sure, there are instances when we do not take the 
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default. To be sure, there are instances when we do not take the likeness of the 
collective experience as the norm: when we feel excluded or when we put our-
selves deliberately outside the group. However, as long as there are no explicit 
sociological or cultural differences from the outset, the default of the collective 
experience holds. The silent attentive audience is particularly helpful for this 
collective experience.  
 
We should not forget that the collective experience of acting jointly may also 
allow for a special kind of pleasure. Sitting in the audience and watching a film 
jointly can be pleasurable because of the fact that we all do this at this very 
moment. Much as when we silently go for a walk together, when we watch a 
film together the pleasure can derive from the flow of our joint action: from the 
fact that we are dedicated to a silent activity. In contrast to other kinds of spec-
tatorship the silent attentive audience is conducive to this pleasure of acting 
jointly, because synchronisation and coordination are rather easily achieved: 
we simply have to focus on the film and watch it in silent, motionless attention. 
Alternative kinds of joint action in the cinema – singing along, speaking the 
dialogues, screaming, and even laughing together – are much harder to syn-
chronise and coordinate. On the other hand, collective silent attention is also 
particularly fragile, because its preconditions are so easily undermined. Unlike 
a person who falls asleep and thus remains inconspicuous, someone taking a 
call or talking loudly to his neighbour signals that he or she – however tempo-
rarily – has no we-intention, does not attend jointly, is acting individually. 
Watching a film jointly in silent attention enables a collective experi-
ence per se that we, as viewers, do not have to reflect upon in order to enjoy. 
Just as I can prefer taking a walk with someone to walking alone without 
thinking about the fact that we are doing this together, I can enjoy watching a 
film collectively without being fully aware of this fact. However, watching a 
film in silent attention can also become the basis of a different kind of collective 
experience: the sharing of emotion and affect. In this case, there is not only 
shared activity, but also shared feeling. Fear, for example: like no other director 
Alfred Hitchcock voiced his intent to elicit a collective viewer response, to ho-
mogenise and standardise the response of his audience, to create a ‘mass emo-
tion’: ‘If you’ve designed a picture correctly, in terms of its emotional impact, 
the Japanese audience would scream at the same time as the Indian audi-
ence.’42 Particularly celebrated in this respect is Hitchcock’s attempt to make 
the audience watch Psycho (1960) from beginning to end, in that order. Via 
trailers he would urge audiences to come in time; latecomers were not admit-
ted.43 Astonishingly, viewers voluntarily submitted to Hitchcock’s dictates. 
Why? 
In her essay on Psycho Williams argues that there were significant ben-
efits that turned the audience into willing disciples. The rapt collective atten-
tion made fear all the more acute and effective: the greater the bodily disci-
pline, the more bodily reactions. Furthermore, the collective emotions and per-
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formative responses created a bond between viewers: collectively submitting 
to strictly dictated viewing times and strong regulations how to watch the film 
enhanced the pleasure of the group.44 As Williams notes: ‘What we see here is 
the conception of the audience as a group with a common solidarity – that of 
submitting to an experience of mixed arousal and fear and of recognising those 
reactions in one another and perhaps even performing them for one another.’45 
Discipline seems to be an enormously important part of the social experience 
of cinemagoing, Williams concludes. Watching the film together in silent, fear-
ful attention and breaking out into collective responses at scattered points 
throughout the film, the audience acted jointly as a group and thus enhanced 
the pleasure of its collective experience. While Psycho might be an especially 
useful example, its effects can be found in various other cases as well. 
Silent attentive viewing is a historically and culturally specific active 
response based on display rules and behavioural codes. It is certainly 
socialised and learned, as basically all forms of audience response are. What 
theorists who argue for a kind of learning theory of classical reception seem to 
overlook is the fact that even the various forms of expressive behaviour do not 
come naturally, but have to be ‘learned’ and ‘internalised’. The history of audi-
ence response is full of actively produced ‘audience gestures’ that were often 
the outcome of social expectations rather than a natural reaction.46 As Richard 
Butsch notes in his history of American audiences: ‘How public discourses 
construct audiences, how audiences conceive themselves, and what audiences 
do are historically contingent.’47 The expectations of what audiences have to do 
and the rules about what they should not do change over time. There is no one-
way street of growing self-discipline (Michel Foucault) or suppression of affect 
(Norbert Elias), since this would presuppose that expressive reactions came 
naturally in a quasi-reflexive way.48 If we resuscitate the worn-out analogy 
between the cinema and Plato’s cave, there must already have been audiences 
who followed a spectacle of images in silent rapt attention some 2.500 years 
ago. 
  
By now it should be evident that I take the silent attentive audience to imply a 
specific kind of collectivity. However, this is far from common opinion. A wide-
spread position, most forcefully articulated by Miriam Hansen and Thomas 
Elsaesser, sees individualisation at work.49 In this conclusion I shall put my 
argument to the test and mount a critique of the ‘individualisation thesis.’ 
Both Hansen and Elsaesser argue that historical changes in film style 
and mode of address, exhibition practice and behavioural norms have conse-
quences for viewers’ mode of reception as a collective. As proponents of New 
Film History and steeped in the history of early film, both scholars paradig-
matically contrast two important periods: early cinema versus Classical 
Cinema. Hansen and Elsaesser describe the difference between these periods 
as a story of increasing regulation of the collective audience: a story of disci-
pline and order. Hansen favourably cites the buzz and idle comment, the boo-
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ing and applause, the howling of small boys in neighbourhood cinemas.50 El-
saesser regrets that the audience had to learn to remain seated and concentrate 
on the screen: the change from early nickelodeons without rows of seats to 
later cinemas implies a regulation of an audience forced into order.51 In con-
trast, early cinema was characterised by a constant coming and going, with 
movement enabling or even favouring communication. People smoked in the 
theatres, drank beer, read dime novels and ate sweets: ‘peripheral activities 
that provided potential for an alternative organisation of public experience’, as 
Hansen puts it.52 
The transition from the small neighbourhood nickelodeon to the ele-
gant picture palace, from the exhibitionist cinema of attractions to the voyeur-
istic Classical Hollywood Cinema thus led to an individualisation of viewers. 
In Hansen’s words an ‘instutionalization of private voyeurism in a public space’ 
took place in which an ‘invisible, private consumer’ replaced the ‘social audi-
ence’ (or ‘collective audience’, in Elsaesser’s phrase).53 Hansen even talks about 
an ‘isolation endemic to the classical apparatus.’54 What once was a lively place 
– a communicative public sphere – turned into a lonely crowd of isolated re-
cipients sitting obliviously next to each other. More recently, writing with con-
siderable regret about the silent audience, Jean Châteauvert and André 
Gaudrault note that ‘with silence, the regime of film consumption may have let 
the spectator move imperceptibly from a solidary to a solitary mode of con-
sumption!’55 
Both Hansen and Elsaesser come from a critical background, following 
specific goals that had their undoubted merits as part of a specific film-
historical discourse in the 1990s and early 2000s. However, their critical forma-
tion led these theorists to throw out the baby with the bathwater by neglecting 
important facets of the audience’s collective phenomenology. The recent return 
of phenomenology as well as the growing focus on emotion and affect in film 
studies allows us to judge some of their arguments as too sweeping and arrive 
at more nuanced descriptions of viewer interrelations. Hansen and Elsaesser 
believe that once new modes of exhibition and new norms of behaviour were 
established, the film would cast a spell on viewers, who henceforth followed 
the flow of moving images in isolated absorption. I think that this at once over-
estimates the impact of the film and underestimates the impact of the collective 
viewing situation. Or, perhaps more precisely, Hansen and Elsaesser seem to 
believe that a collective audience experience and absorbed viewing are mutu-
ally exclusive. But is it not possible that ‘addressed as individuals, we simulta-
neously feel embedded in the crowd,’ as Tröhler puts it?56 
Hansen’s concept of the public sphere and Elsaesser’s notion of the col-
lective audience depend on verbal communication and other kinds of com-
municative interaction, which they oppose to the still, silent and absorbed 
audience of Classical Hollywood reception. The individualisation thesis is 
therefore particularly convincing if we consider the social experience of the 
cinema in terms of face-to-face interaction and expressive participation. But this is a 
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reductive perspective on social life. We can easily come up with examples of 
less-than-passive social experiences that do not involve face-to-face interaction 
and expressive participation. Just think of playing music together, meditating 
together or silently mourning together during a funeral. The individualisation 
thesis seems to me one-sided, because it conceives of social life in a specific, 
highly normative, way. This normativity becomes all too obvious when Han-
sen decries the rule of silence as a middle-class suppression of ‘working-class 
norms of conviviality and expressivity’ and Elsaesser considers silent and con-
centrated reception as a contradictory behaviour that is not natural, but had to 
be learned.57 Here the authors come close to articulating a romanticised anti-
bourgeois idealisation of the communicativeness and liveliness of the lower 
classes. They overlook that we-intention, joint attention and joint action can 
imply a different type of collectivity. 
Furthermore, there is at least a certain logical tension between the no-
tion of a homogenous group of classical spectators and the idea of an isolated and 
individualised viewer. At the same time, the assumption that the diverse bois-
terous audiences of the nickelodeon necessarily formed a collective sounds 
somewhat problematic. Hansen notes that the early-to-Classical transforma-
tions ‘subdue the social and cultural distinctions among viewers and turn them 
into a homogenous group of spectators.’58 But if there were strong social and 
cultural distinctions with ingroups and outgroups, how could there be a collec-
tive audience in an emphatic sense?  
Moreover, the individualisation thesis harbours another contradiction: 
the individualisation of the viewer supposedly took place at the moment when 
in the urban centres of North America and Europe the audiences inside cine-
mas grew massively in size. At the end of the 1920s the famous Roxy theatre in 
New York offered seats to more than 6,200 viewers. In Europe cinemas like the 
Ufa-Filmpalast in Hamburg existed with more than 2,700 seats. Did the view-
ers in these cinemas have no sense of watching the film jointly, but rather con-
sidered themselves as a lonely crowd? Compared to the dozens of viewers in 
small storefront theatres, the hundreds and even thousands of people follow-
ing a film in the 1910s and 1920s meant a completely different collective ex-
perience. We might ask, then, why viewers would accept all these negative 
transformations? Possibly because the story of loss was intertwined with a 
story of gain. Hansen and Elsaesser remain oblivious to this compensatory 
reward.59 
 
To some readers my revaluation of the silent attentive audience may seem 
retrograde or normatively constraining. Especially against the background of a 
Brechtian-Benjaminian-Frankfurt School critique of mass culture and the 
‘bourgeois’ reception practices of uncritical absorbed contemplation (a critique 
that feeds the individualisation thesis), my arguments may sound like an apo-
logia for the culture industry and the embourgeoisement of the cinematic experi-
ence. This is definitely not my intention.  
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Firstly, my vindication of the silent attentive audience is valid also for 
the reception of many experimental, avant-garde or modernist works. The sus-
penseful reception of a Hollywood thriller like The Silence of the Lambs (Jona-
than Demme, 1991) may look like the prototype. But the focused attention paid 
to a modernist auteur work like Persona (Ingmar Bergman, 1966) in an art-house 
cinema counts just as well as the silent concentration that audiences in a film 
museum (or the Invisible Cinema, for that matter) devote to an avant-garde 
film like Wavelength (Michael Snow, 1967). I am not saying that these types of 
film are experienced identically. What I have tried to show is merely that 
where people watch a film in silent attention my argument about the cinema as 
joint action is applicable to all types of film. 
Secondly, my argument for the silent audience’s collective dimension 
does not subscribe to a ‘bourgeois’ understanding of aesthetic experience, with 
its connotation of an individual devotion to and contemplation of the work of 
art. In this respect I agree with Walter Benjamin who contrasts the solitary ex-
perience of a painting with the experience of film as ‘an object of simultaneous 
collective reception’.60 However, unlike Benjamin I have not celebrated a dis-
tractive mode of spectatorship as politically emancipating or morally signifi-
cant here. Rather, my argument implies that watching a film in silent attention 
can enable one of the rare instances in our culture in which we do not have a 
dissonance of intentions requiring coordination (since we all intend to do the 
same thing); we are not subject to a permanent imperative to decide (since we 
have already decided what to do); and we are not forced to create collectivity 
through verbal or written interaction (since our joint action is based on collec-
tive silent attention). This neither implies that I want to discard Benjamin’s 
intervention, nor does it mean that I intend to set the silent attentive audience 
as the norm. Although this article may be read as a forceful plea to reconsider 
the benefits of the silent attentive audience, I have tried to avoid sounding 
normative. 
Thirdly, my argument does not depend on naïve, uncritical absorption, 
but allows for critical distance and reflection. In fact, collective silent attention 
may be particularly conducive to reflection. In this regard, Alexander Hor-
warth favourably compares the cinema with the museum: ‘in today’s socio-
economic and cultural climate the spatially and durationally unflexible space of 
cinema is potentially more inviting to a reflective or critical experience of the 
world via images than most museum spaces are.’61 Note, however, that the 
type of joint action suggested in this essay has its roots in analytic social phi-
losophy and philosophical theories of action rather than in political science. 
One would expect too much from the notion of joint action if it were under-
stood in terms of resistance or collective struggle: joint action, as I use the term, 
does not equate to political activism (even if it does not rule out more political 
forms of action in the long run).   
Last but not least, in my book on the phenomenology of fear in the 
cinema I have myself argued for the advantages expressive reactions can have 
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for the establishment of collectivity. For instance, screaming collectively in 
moments of shock is precisely a way of communicating with others – and thus 
enabling a collective experience.62 While audience communication is not cele-
brated in the present essay, this does not mean that I reject these kinds of spec-
tatorship. I simply offer an heuristic that allows us to differentiate various types 
of collective experience – the silent attentive one among them. 
Pointing out that even silent attentive viewing implies a type of collec-
tive experience, my argument may ultimately underscore what is at stake once 
the film experience increasingly becomes a truly individualised and solitary 
experience: when viewers watch films alone on television screens, computer 
monitors, smart phones and the like. There has been no intention here of inton-
ing a nostalgic aria about the disappearance of the theatrical experience. But at 
the same time I want to go beyond simply noticing that something is, for better 
or worse, changing: I wanted to present a strong argument as to why silently 
watching a film alone is not the same as silently watching a film jointly minus 
other viewers. In an important way, it is a different experience: Silent collective 
attention, then, is an enabling condition for another type of collectivity – one 
very much in tune with societies that insist on remaining highly individualised 
and yet simultaneously yearn for a collective experience.63 If we consider 
watching a film in a cinema as an inherently social act – a joint action with col-
lective intentions and often shared feelings – we gain a different picture. View-
ers are no longer part of an individualised lonely crowd. Watching a film with 
others means watching a film jointly. 
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